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Farah, M. (ed.): 2010, Neuroethics. An Introduction with
Readings. Cambridge, Mass; MIT Press. 379 pages. ISBN
978-0262514606. Price: £25,95
Martha J. Farah is Professor at the Department of Psy-
chology of the University of Pennsylvania, where she is
head of the Center for Neuroscience and Society. She is
widely recognized as one of the worldwide leading schol-
ars in the area of neuroethics. In this book she offers an
‘‘introduction with readings’’ into the field, including arti-
cles written by herself and by other recognized experts,
such as Judy Iles, Robert Cook-Degan, Eric Racine,
Michael Gazzaniga, Eric Parens and Patricia King, among
others. After an overview of neuroethics, the book presents
five topics: human enhancement (‘‘Better brains’’), identity
and authenticity (‘‘Brain, Self, and Authenticity’’), neuro-
imaging (‘‘Brain Reading’’), use of brain knowledge the
Courts (‘‘Neuroscience and Justice’’), and the concept of
personhood (‘‘Brains and Persons’’).
Through the choice of the readings and the introduc-
tions, we can easily infer that Farah supports the thesis that
neuroscience and its recent findings already have a huge
impact on our conception of ourselves as human beings,
and on the type of morality to which we are committed.
This is not surprising: as we become better able to know
how the brain functions (under the skull and not only
through the behaviour), and as the brain is the support of
our mental life and of our identity, the new knowledge of
our brain acquired through neurosciences is a knowledge of
what kind of beings we are. Besides, our morality cannot
ignore what we are as human beings, if it wants to have an
impact on our behaviour and on our social life.
The readings collected in the book offer a wide array of
divergent positions; each topic is presented by authors
supporting different views. Therefore the book does not
defend a particular opinion, but tries to offer tools allowing
readers to forge their own views. For instance, on the
question of the impact of neurodeterminism (the thesis that
what goes on in our brain determines our behaviour) on the
law, Farah presents the two different positions of Greene
and Cohen on the one side (the position of hard deter-
minists who think that the discoveries of neuroscience
force us to change our legal system of retribution), and the
position of Morse on the other side (the point of view of
compatibilists, who think that the same discoveries do not
compel us to change anything).
This anthology of neuroethics’ texts is not the first
published; but as the field progresses rapidly, accompanied
by a growing number of publications, this anthology is
welcome. It gathers important texts and presents them in a
manner that allows the reader to have a good grip on this
emerging field.
Bernard Baertschi
Geneva, Switzerland
Segall, S: 2009, Health, Luck, and Justice. Princeton:
Princeton University Press. 252 pages. ISBN
978-0691140537. Price: € 28.99
Although the leading luck egalitarian Ronald Dworkin
has dealt with health care allocation issues, Shlomi Segall’s
Health, Luck, and Justice is the first book-length attempt to
systematically apply luck egalitarianism to the just distri-
bution of health care. The doctrine of luck egalitarianism is
by now the main rival approach to Rawls’ theory of justice
in this field (see chapter 1 of this book for Segall’s view on
this relation, but have in mind that both approaches are
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within the same camp). Its core claim is that outcomes of
brute luck (i.e. those that are not the results of conscious
choices) have to be compensated. Disadvantages for which
the individual cannot be held responsible should not make
difference in terms of health and health care. This is the
basic message when luck egalitarianism deals with health
care allocation issues.
At first sight, applying luck egalitarianism to these
problems leads to counterintuitive results. Since many
health problems are related to the way people live their
lives, it seems that they have to carry the burden of their
decisions and should not be allowed to rely on social
systems which are financed by taxes. Our solidarity in these
matters would end if health problems are results of indi-
vidual choices. At the same time, empirical studies show
that many health inequalities in our societies are not related
to inequality in access to health care but to other social
factors (e. g. education, recognition in labour, structure of
neighbourhoods etc.) or to natural differences, such as
genetic factors. How can a society based on luck egali-
tarianism deal with these differences in health and life
expectancy, which are caused by the overall structure of
our society or natural differences?
Segall has organized his book in three main parts. After
a first introductory chapter that presents the doctrine of
luck egalitarianism, he analyses in Part I various issues
relating to health care and responsibility, attempting to
establish a system of basic and universal health care for all.
Although this result is plausible it has to be stated that
Segall can reach his conclusion only by balancing justice
with other values. In Part II health itself becomes the
subject of luck egalitarianism. The four chapters in this
section of the book try to show that health and life
expectancy are distributed unequally due to the overall
organization of our societies. One basic move in Segall’s
argument (mainly to protect him from the levelling-down
effect of equal distribution of health) is to accept that
equality is of limited (i.e. instrumental) value in health
(chapter 8). The final Part of this book widens the scope by
taking into account the sub-national level of health care
systems (chapter 10) on the one hand, and the trans-
national perspective of global justice (chapter 11) on the
other. These chapters are especially interesting since the
main difference between the Rawlsian political conception
of justice and the cosmic conception embedded in luck
egalitarianism becomes visible here. Furthermore Segall’s
arguments make a good point in demonstrating that luck
egalitarianism can take into account the political structure
of the problems of health care even if the notion of justice
is not taken as essentially political in itself.
Segall’s book is an important contribution to the dis-
cussion of justice in health care which shows how far
theories of justice, especially a luck egalitarian approach,
can deal with the normative problems we face in this
context. But it is also important in showing the limits of
theories of justice when we think about the value of health
in our overall scheme of good lives and human flourishing.
Segall is very good in demonstrating that ignoring indi-
vidual responsibility in this context is ethically unaccept-
able. But one might get the impression that social
structures frame individuals in such a way and at so early
stage in their lives that the available options are limited
regarding the question of leading a healthy life. From this
viewpoint, it might still be the case that theories of justice
which start from individual responsibility of persons and
patients do always come too late.
Michael Quante
Mu¨nster, Germany
Helmchen, H., Sartorius, N. (eds.): 2010, Ethics in
Psychiatry. European Contributions. Dordrecht: Springer.
485 pages. ISBN: 978-9048187201. Price: € 149,00
The history of psychiatry is highly controversial and
strongly woven into conflicts of cultural values and polit-
ical systems. It also deals with individual situations and
vulnerable life plans. The tension between a certain social
framework and individual ethics makes ethics in psychiatry
a very difficult but fascinating challenge; a challenge
recklessly neglected in the past and still disregarded in
today’s education.
The concept of the editors, Hanfried Helmchen and
Norman Sartorius, both experienced and renowned clini-
cians, scientists and thinkers in the field of psychiatry is
particularly praiseworthy. It not only offers an updated,
comprehensible anthology for professionals in psychiatry
but also takes into account the influence of European his-
tory and culture on current ethical issues.
With this in mind, the still complex and overwhelming
material was divided into six parts. The first part presents an
overview of the field where most ethical issues regarding
psychiatry arise. Further, it describes the significant problem
of stigmatization, highlights the economical and legal
framework, and discusses the role of institutional ethics. The
second part provides an introduction to ethical principles,
concepts, recommendations and guidelines, trying to explain
why psychiatrics has ever since been struggling to imple-
ment them. The third part deals with concrete ethical prob-
lems in clinical and research settings. Moreover, it focuses
on the important question of how to implement ethics and
procedures in institutions. The fourth part challenges the
non-medical use of psychiatry with an eye on enhancement
and the influence (or abuse) of psychiatry in political con-
texts. The fifth part challenges different ways of making
professionals sensitive to ethical practice and, finally, the
sixth part draws the conclusions of the previous chapters.
The selection of topics and authors has been carefully
done. I would, however, like to question the way the book
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incorporates the concept of European contributions, which
is prominently indicated in the subtitle. There is no doubt
about the importance of developing a European anthology
in this field to counterbalance the US-dominated literature
on ethics in psychiatry. However, besides the great heter-
ogeneity that exists between different European countries,
it is not clear enough what the difference between Euro-
pean and other contributors are. In addition, it is not
apparent whether the authors speak for their country, for
Europe or for psychiatry in general. Almost none of the
eight authors who do not come either from a German-
speaking country or from the UK did get the chance to
make a general statement on the values and specialties in
their country. It would have been interesting to learn, for
instance, about the impact of the most radical law con-
cerning deinstitutionalization in Italy in 1978 on today’s
clinical practice from the Italian contributor’s perspective.
Or in another chapter it would have been crucial to chal-
lenge the massive variation in numbers of compulsory
treatment between different European countries. The irri-
tating difference is commented with the conclusion of
ethical significance but neither preventable causes nor
possible solutions are discussed from a viewpoint of the
European contributors. Whether there is a European-spe-
cific psychiatry or not, a more dialogically based approach
(e.g. comments from different contributors at the end of
each chapters) would have been a chance to get more out of
the interesting concept of European contributions.
Nevertheless, this updated, comprehensive and careful
selection of articles makes this anthology a valuable (and
pricey) book. Besides an informative overview about ethics
and psychiatry, the anthology makes a first step towards a
broader discussion about European-specific values in
psychiatry.
Ju¨rg C. Streuli
Zurich, Switzerland
Ahlze´n, R.: 2010. Why should physicians read?
Understanding clinical judgement and its relation to lit-
erary experience. Karlstad (Sweden): Karlstad University
Press. 372 pages. ISBN 978-9170633119. Price: £ 25,00
(the book can be directly obtained from the author:
Rolf.Ahlzen@kau.se)
Physicians could be better practitioners if they read lit-
erary texts in addition to medical literature. This is the
underlying claim in Rolf Ahlze´n’s book, Why Should
Physicians Read? Is this saying anything other than that
doctors should have an extensive education to equip them
to relate better to their patients? If it was a question of
understanding modern culture, they might be better
employed reading the tabloid press and scandal magazines.
No; Ahlze´n is addressing a much deeper problem that, he
argues, goes back to the ‘scientific revolution’ that began in
the 17th Century with Copernicus and continued through to
Darwin: if the Earth is merely an insignificant speck in an
immense Universe on which human beings exist for a
moment as no more than highly evolved life-forms, where
does it leave ideas of the human soul, personal identity,
meaning and free will?
Modern medicine’s notable success has been achieved
as the result of a scientific rational interpretation of illness,
but it has largely failed to incorporate the personal human
experience of illness that is the patient’s perspective. This
view underpins criticisms of medicine as impersonal, and,
despite the major advances in medical knowledge and
technology, an unease with the direction in which Western
medicine is going. In recent years alternative perspectives
on health care have been put forward, including the phe-
nomenological emphasis on the patient’s experience of the
‘lived body’, and narrative-based care in which the illness
is understood from the patient’s standpoint, as part of their
life-story.
Ahlze´n supports these, but adds to them by suggesting
that literature can make its own contribution by enabling
physicians make more effective clinical judgements. This,
as Feinstein argued, is not about making the correct diag-
nosis, but doing what is best for the patient, which means
appreciating the patient’s perspective rather than just fixing
the body machinery. Ahlze´n links clinical judgement with
Aristotle’s notion of phronesis—practical knowledge
(contrasted with Aristotle’s other components of practice,
episteme and techne—theory and instrumentality). Ah-
lze´n’s claim is that familiarity with literature—novels,
drama, poetry—can enhance clinical judgement by
increasing the physician’s empathy with the patient along
with her understanding and experience (albeit vicarious) of
human suffering and need.
It is not just that familiarity with literature is desirable in
order to humanize scientific medicine. Stephen Toulmin
reminds us that the clinical encounter, particularly, taking
the patient’s history, is the heart of clinical practice. Rec-
ognising the physician as the person who interprets and
gives meaning to the illness experience is central to
understanding the role of the doctor. This is a literary task
in itself.
This book should be essential reading for all newly
graduated physicians, not just to persuade them to read, but
to remind them of the internal aims of medicine and the
role of the physician as interpreter and co-author in its
hermeneutical task.
Stephen Tyreman
London, UK
Peterson, J.C.: 2010, Changing Human Nature, Ecology,
Ethics, Genes, and God. Grand Rapids: Eerdmans. 259
pages. ISBN 978-0802865496. Price € 13.99
In Changing Human Nature, the American theologian
James C. Peterson gives a Christian defense of genetic
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intervention on human beings. He argues that we are called
to alter nature, which includes our bodies, and therefore our
genes. Peterson proceeds in four parts. First, after arguing
that nature ¯including ourselves¯ is changing, not static,
Peterson shows that we have a responsibility towards cre-
ation. He writes, ‘‘Human beings were created to naturally
change nature’’ (p. 91) and to ‘‘sustain, restore, and
improve ourselves and our world’’ (p. 152). To do so, we
can use technology, which we can direct to help us, not
harm us. Moreover, because human nature is dynamic, we
can alter our bodies and genes for the better. Second,
Peterson criticizes three popular guidelines used to offer
caution about altering human nature: enhancement vs.
therapy, designing vs. welcoming, present vs. future,
arguing that each guideline is inadequate and sometimes
misleading. Third, he outlines four standards better suited
to guide us: Safety, Improvement, Increase Choice for the
Recipient, and Best Use of Resources. Finally, he addresses
the question of who will be in charge of applying these
standards.
Peterson successfully demonstrates that, in fact, human
nature is dynamic, not static, even if this is not by itself a
reason for deliberately modifying it. He is also right that our
current guiding criteria are not sufficient and often prob-
lematic. Additionally, we can admire his effort to come up
with new standards to improve the current criteria. However,
his principles seem incomplete and might lack stronger
guidance. For instance, one could argue that transgenesis
will change nature for the better. Nevertheless, one should
also reflect why more choice is necessarily better, or what
higher purposes it serves. Let us suppose that people decide
to transfer genes that will allow their children to glow in the
dark (as it has already been done with monkey). This new
ability and the procedure would be safe. This will increase
the recipients’ capacities, as they will be able to be a light in
the dark. However, would this radical change make people
‘‘better’’? It is very likely that many would consider such an
enhancement as ‘‘dehumanizing’’. Therefore, it seems that
we need additional standards to prevent unintended conse-
quences, from which we have already seen disaster as we
have altered our ecosystem. Some could say that enhance-
ment should be restricted to the use of human genes. How-
ever, if we already use pigs’ valves to improve humankind,
why not pigs’ genes? Therefore, ethicists still need to think of
what standard should be added here.
Negatively, while Peterson confronts bioconservative
voices in this debate, he does not challenge bioliberals or
transhumanists. What does Peterson think of their views of
radically altering human nature? It seems that Christian
thinkers would not agree with mind uploading, as its denies
the importance of the incarnation and bodily resurrection.
Positively, while some Christians might complain that
Peterson’s views make no more difference than a bioliberal
stance, it might simply be that they share the same view.
Moreover, it also shows how theology can bring a rea-
sonable input in this discussion.
Finally, even though the book seems incomplete, it will
be an excellent read for anyone interested in questions
about how far we should modify nature. One can surely
build on Peterson’s proposal in order to keep searching for
an answer. Readers will enjoy it, as the book is well
written, logically argued and informed from a sound
theological viewpoint. Alongside this book, I would rec-
ommend reading a more moderate Christian position,
which gives a middle ground between bioconservatives and
bioliberals: Biotechnology and The Human Good by C.
Ben Mitchell (Georgetown University Press, 2007).
Johann A. R. Roduit
Zurich, Switzerland
Nordgren, A.: 2010, For Our children. The Ethics of
Animal Experimentation in the Age of Genetic Engineer-
ing. Amsterdam: Rodopi. 214 pages. ISBN:
978-9042028043. Price: € 52.99
The purpose of this book is to develop a middle course
position between the existing ones regarding animal
experimentation, and to appeal for that to a social ethics
perspective. The choice of a middle course position is
rooted in a re-interpretation of Mary Midgley’s argument
of the Human-weak priority: Animal experimentation that
inflicts harm on animals is prima facie wrong, unless cer-
tain special considerations suggest the opposite. These
special conditions are the ones stated in the 3Rs principles
(reduction, refinement and replacement) together with the
following: the purpose of the experiment is of vital human
interest; the experiment is likely to be of human benefit; the
harm inflicted on the animals is outweighed by the
expected human benefit (p. 74). The choice of a social
ethical perspective, instead of an individual or personal one
(p. 2) is motivated by the attention to empirical studies on
public opinion on this topic. Nordgren’s position is based
on the open acceptance of speciecist arguments, which he
derives from Midgley: ‘‘A fundamental disanalogy exists
between harming mice and rats in experiments and harm-
ing citizens in other countries. The difference is that our
relations to human beings differ from our relations to mice
and rats.’’ (p. 73).
The philosophical discussion of the five ethical proto-
types on animal experimentation provides interesting
insights into the main argumentative structures and logic of
the arguments, and the author is largely committed to
provide a robust foundation for his position. The knowl-
edge about technical problems relating to genetic engi-
neering in animals is solid. However, the lack of a very
specific discussion on the problems of genetic engineering
is striking, given the fact that the book is the result of two
research projects on the ethics of transgenic laboratory
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animals. There is no discussion on the criteria to assess
scientific validity of the transgenic animal experiments, in
particular on the fact that the specific goals of these
experiments are in most of the cases questions which are
only answerable in transgenic animal models, so that the
lack of alternatives in many cases becomes a sort of self-
fulfilling prophecy. This is very well shown by the fact that
by the application of his ethical-trade-off-model to four
cases of published scientific experiments (p. 174-179),
Nordgren comes to a positive evaluation of all of them.
There is also no discussion of the ethically relevant fact
that genetic engineering of laboratory animals has brought
to a huge increase of the number of animals used.
Furthermore, no further explanation is provided to the
fact that even if we accept ‘‘weak’’ speciecism, precisely
because of the obligations to animals, the assessment of the
benefits of an animal experiment cannot be exhaustively
analyzed only on a case-by-case basis, but it also requires a
general rethinking of the founding systems and the dis-
proportion between alternative methods and animal
experiments.
Last but not least, although the effort to establish a link
between philosophical argumentation and empirical results
on public opinion’s attitudes is important and reflects one
of the major trends of contemporary applied ethics, it is not
clear at all how it should work practically and theoretically.
Nordgren does not mention the problems connected with
scientific communication, that is, how and who assess the
benefits of animal experiments and provide information to
the public? Also the implications of the killing and suf-
fering of animals remain unanswered. Finally, an addi-
tional point remains unclear: should the ethical analysis of
a problem be aligned with the average opinion of the public
(i.e. to the status quo)?
Arianna Ferrari
Karlsruhe, Germany
Do¨rries A., Neitzke, G., Simon, A., Vollmann, J. (eds.):
2010, Klinische Ethikberatung. Ein Praxisbuch fu¨r Kra-
nkenha¨user und Einrichtungen der Altenpflege, 2nd ed.
Stuttgart: Kohlhammer. 242 pages. ISBN: 978-3170212480.
Price: € 39,90
For those who work in the field of clinical bioethics, and
for those who are interested in implementing clinical ethics
consultation services or ethics committees, this book may
serve as a very useful tool.
The introductory part (chapters 1 and 2) offers an
overview on the state of implementation of clinical ethics
services in Germany (based on a recent survey), and on the
theoretical (philosophical and theological) background of
clinical ethics. The focus is placed on the practical
helpfulness of ethical theories and competences. Some
topics are outlined a little bit broad-brushed (e.g. the sep-
aration of is and ought, descriptive and normative ethics)
but for beginners in clinical ethics these chapters summa-
rize the basic knowledge in a well structured way.
The main part of the book (chapters 3–7) deals with
practice, methods, implementation, evaluation, chances
and pitfalls of clinical ethics services and ethics commit-
tees from an individual and organizational point of view.
This part is interesting and helpful even for experienced
clinical ethicists and also from an international perspective.
In Chapter 3 (‘‘practice of clinical ethics services’’)
Neitzke describes aims and models of clinical ethics,
introducing a very valuable differentiation (‘‘expert mod-
els’’, delegation models’’, ‘‘process models’’ and ‘‘open
models’’) favoring the process model, specifically of a team
of members of clinical ethics committees. Richter depicts
pros and cons of ethics liaison service and ethical rounds
implemented in a University clinic by the author,
describing this model as a form of preventive ethics
especially (but not as the only one) suitable for intensive
care units. Chapter 4 describes structured methods of eth-
ical case deliberations are, mostly reviewing the European,
and especially German speaking countries, and offers two
examples of case deliberation. Especially the first one is
interesting since it represents one of the rare documenta-
tions of a case deliberation on the ward being very helpful
to really ‘‘grasp’’ what clinical ethics support can be and
do. In the same manner as for case deliberation, the process
of implementation is described close to and useful for
practice via the analytic depiction of processes and
examples of implementing a clinical ethics service in a
university and a smaller hospital. Chapters 6 (organiza-
tional ethics) and 7 (Quality Assessment and evaluation)
complete the main topics of clinical ethics practice.
Finally, the book outlines some legal questions and
specific features and challenges of ethic consultation in
nursing homes. It also includes the statutes of ethics
committees and recommendations for implementation. All
in all, the book clearly meets its aim of giving a practically
oriented introduction to clinical ethics services. In some
parts, the international perspective could have been stron-
ger, since most chapters are focused on the German
speaking context. Special issues (e.g. pediatrics) or how to
address specific topics (e.g. abortion, confidentiality) are
not included but this does not minimize the aim of giving a
useful introduction into the field.
Tanja Krones
Zurich, Switzerland
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